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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEONARD M. OLSON, 
Plaintiff and AppellantJ 
vs. c:ase No. 
INDEPENDENT ORDER OF FORESTERS, 8668 
a corporation, and THOMAS McGAHAN, 
Defendants and Respondents._. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below. 
All italics are ours. 
B. THE FACTS 
The plaintiff was employed by the defendant insur-
ance company (a Canadian Corporation) during the year 
1947 (P. 31). That under his contract of employment, 
he became its manager of the State of Utah, with head-
quarters at Salt Lake C'ity and Provo (P. 32). That under 
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his contract of employment, he was empowered to organ-
ize the business affairs of the defendant company for 
the purpose of selling memberships by way of insurance 
and to employ ,any and all agents for that purpose in 
the conduct of defendant's affairs (P. 32). That he con-
tinued such employment on, up, and until the 17th day 
of February, 1954, at which time his employment was 
terminated pur.suant to verbal notice given to him over 
the tele·phone in December, 1953, and later confirmed by 
letter that his services would terminate as of Feb. 17, 
1954 (PP. 33, 164). That by virtue of the telephone com-
munication, plaintiff was instructed by the defendant 
company to turn over all the books and records in plain-
tiff's office to a new man that \Yas coming in to take 
plaintiff's place and also he was ordered to turn all 
monies in his posse.ssion without an audit, to ascertain 
the exact amounts that might be due either party (PP. 
33-35, 164). This the plaintiff refused to do stating 
definitely and emphatically that before turning over any 
monies, he insisted on an audit being made of the books 
by the company, which in turn they refused to do (PP. 
34-35, 165). That on Feb. 18, 1954, plaintiff caused to be 
mailed to the defendant company a registered letter 
wherein he stated that he had the monies that he withheld 
in his possession ,and intended to keep the same until 
a complete audit was had bet,veen the parties. (See Ex-
hibit 2, P. 42-43-44-45.) That at no time or at all did 
the defendant company furnish the plaintiff \Yith an audit 
showing that what w.as owing fron1 one party to the other 
for the purpose of striking a balance due and payable 
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to one party or the other (P. 45). That the bank records 
show that on Feb. 18, 1954, the plaintiff transferred the r-----. 
fund in que.stion in the sum of approximately $5400 from 
the .account of the defendant company by him to his ( 
I 
personal account in Utah Savings and Trust Company of \. -r~ 
·-. ( . 
Salt Lake City, Utah (P. 49). That thereafter and prior ),fr..1 c:) 
to plaintiff leaving the State of Utah for the State of ; 1/c/! (;! 
California to secure other employment, he transferred ( J. · 
said sum to his credit with the First Security Bank of \ 
Utah, at Salt Lake City, Utah (P. 50). And that there- / 
after, in the month of Novemb~r, 1955, he left the State \ 
of Utah for the State of California and set up his home / 
at Walnut Creek, California, and ~ said f~!Lt:r:l,},n,s/ 
£erred to his credit at his new residence. 
From Feb. 17, 1954, up to and including Oct. 27, 1954, 
numerou.s conferences were had between the attorneys 
for the plaintiff and the attorneys for the defendant 
company, in an attempt to arrive at some reasonable basis 
to estimate a settlement between the· parties (P. 46). 
When the plaintiff w.as unable to secure an audit fron1 
the defendant company, he instituted suit in the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake c·ounty, on the 27th 
day of October, 1955, in which he demanded an audit and 
an accounting between himself and the defendant com-
pany, for the purpose of determining who owned who, 
so that the differences between the parties could be set-
tled by judicial determination (P. 46). The defendant 
company filed two counterclaims ·against the plaintiff in 
said suit, neither of which contained an accounting or an 
audit. 
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In the accounting suit now pending in the District 
Court, there was a pretrial had thereon on ~fay 6, 1955, 
before Judge David T. Lewis and the order provided-
"In view of the offer, the Court adjudges that, 
there is no issue in the case, other than to have 
an accounting between the parties -the parties 
desire time to make this accounting one to the 
other, and the matter is continued without date 
with the limitation placed upon any trial of issue 
limiting such issues to accounting issues referred 
to (P. 48)." 
On January 20, 1956, the accounting case \Yas set for 
trial, at which time the matter was continued and among 
other things, the Court made an order that the plaintiff 
pay into Court, pending the ultimate outcome of the case, 
the sum of $5460.62, on or before ~larch 1, 1956, at "~hich 
time and place, the plaintiff agreed so to do and, subse-
quently, did deposit said amount with the Clerk of the 
District Court, where it still ren1ains (P. 58). The Court 
also ordered that the plaintiff pay into Court, for the 
purpose of having an audit made, the sum of $200.00, 
which plaintiff did (P. 58). 
That immediately at the conclusion of this hearing 
before Judge Lewis, the plaintiff and his eounsel, nlr. 
Beezley, (now dece.a.sed) "~alked out of Judge Le,Yis' 
chambers into the hall of the City and County Bldg., 
whereupon the plaintiff was in1mediately placed under 
arrest by virtue of a warrant based upon a cri1ninal conl-
plaint charging him with embezzlement, signed and s\\~orn 
to by Mr. McGahan, a field auditor for defendant com-
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pany the day before. Thereupon the plaintiff was im-
mediately taken before a Committing Magistrate and re-
leased without bond and allowed to leave the State of 
Utah (P. 58 and 59). 
Pursuant to the order made in the hearing before 
Judge Lewis on May 20, 1955, the plaintiff employed the 
auditing firm of Lincoln G. Kelly & Co. of Salt Lake City 
to make an audit for which he paid the sum of $200.00 
and which audit has been introduced in evidence in this 
case, marked Exhibit 9, wherein the audit shows a total 
potential commission due the plaintiff from the defendant 
in the sum of $9,573.62 (P. 58). And this is the only audit 
that was ever made between the parties and which the 
defendant now seeks to repudiate, although defendant 
to this day has not complied with the pre-trial order of 
the Court, in which each party was ordered to give to the 
other an accounting. The plaintiff has complied with the 
order, but the defendant has not and still refuses so to 
do. Therefore, the only factual proof before the Court 
as to who owe.s who in this accounting case is Exhibit 9 
which shows the defendant company in debt to the plain-
tiff in excess of $9,000.00. 
At the trial of the criminal case, on which Mr. Olson 
was charged with embezzlement, he was acquitted by a 
jury in the District Court (P. 76). 
Mrs. Elaine Olson, the wife of the plaintiff, was em-
ployed .as the financial secretary of the Salt Lake office 
of the defendant herein, (P. 163), and she kept all books 
and records of the company from 1947 until the date of 
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Mr. Olson's termination of employment. She listened in 
on a telephone conversation with 1\tfr. Carlisle, the Vice 
President of the defendant company in December of 
1953, in which Mr. Carlisle told Mr. Olson that he would 
be replaced in January or February, .as State Manager 
( P. 164), and the said Car lisle requested Olson to turn 
over all money to his successor a 1\fr. 11ason, and Olson 
replied that he wouldn't turn the money over until he 
had an audit (P.164-165). Mr. c·arlisle then wrote Olson 
about the 20th of January that they would not bring an 
auditor to Utah just to accommodate Olson, and that they 
'Nould make an audit sometime after his termination, but 
they gave no specific date as to when they would actually 
make an audit (P. 165). She went down to the company 
office in Salt Lake City and made a check of 1\Ir. Olson's 
business for the preceding seven years, and from her 
check of the records and books, she computed what she 
had figured the company books showed was owing :Jfr. 
Olson, and that was the su1n of $16,000.00 (P. 166-167). 
At that time, Mr. Olson had $5,460.62 in the bank. The 
next day, the plaintiff and his ·wi.fe \Yent to see }.fr. 
Romney, a Salt Lake attorney, and explained the financial 
question with him (P.167), and as a result of this con-
feTence, Attorney Ro1nney \Yrote a letter to the defendant 
company (P. 168-Exhibit 2), advising the defendant that 
Mr. Olson was holding the $5,460.62 until .an audit could 
be made determining who was entitled to this money. To 
this letter no offer of settlen1ent was made by the defend-
ant between Feb. and Oct., 195-!. So in order to bring 
the matter to a head, the plaintiff con1n1enced a civil 
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action in the District Court for an accounting (P. 169). 
Plaintiff left Utah on Nove1nber 4, 1955 and went to 
W.alnut Creek, California, and before moving he left 
his forwarding address at the Post Office. In December 
of 1955, the plaintiff received a letter from Mr. J. C. 
Carlisle, addressed to his former address in Salt Lake, 
which letter was forwarded immediately to their present 
address in Walnut Creek, California by the postal.author-
ities (P. 171). On or about the 7th of December, the plain-
tiff and his wife received a telegram from Mr. Carlisle 
at Walnut Creek, California asking the plaintiff and his 
vvife to phone him (P. 172). And there.after, the plaintiff 
and his wife went to San Francisco where they had din-
ner vvith Mr. and Mrs. Carlisle and Mr. and Mrs. Cohn, 
who was the State Manager of California for the Inde-
pendent Order of the Foresters (P. 172). 
The audit prepared by Lawrence Olson (no relation 
to the plaintiff, Leonard Olson) who is a partner in the 
firm of Lincoln G. Kelly & Co., certified public account-
ants in Salt Lake City, Utah, and marked Exhibit 9, was 
identified and offered in evidence (P. 174-175) and after 
considerable voir dire examination, by defendants coun-
sel, the Court admitted Exhibit 9 into evidence (P. 179). 
Appellant instituted this action ag.ainst respondent 
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on May 24, 1956. That said action was and 
is based upon malicious prosecution wherein appellant 
sought damages, and that the defendant filed Answer 
to said complaint denying the allegations therein con-
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tained. That said cause was tried before Judge Ray Van 
Cott, Jr. on the 17th day of March, 1957, and that after 
appellants evidence was adduced and appellant rested, 
re.spondent moved for dismissal which motion \vas 
granted by order of said court, from which appellant 
has appealed in this matter (P. 219-220). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO SHOW LACK O·F PROBABLE CAUSE. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN SUSTAINING 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTIO·N FOR A NON SUIT AND IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S ACTION, WITHOUT SUBMIT-
TING THE CAUSE TO THE JURY. 
ARGUn1:ENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO SHOW LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE. 
In this jurisdiction, in order for the plaintiff to 
prove a prima facia case for n1alicious prosecution, he 
must establish three elements: 
1. That the proceeding co1nplained of as grounds 
for the action \vas without probable cause. 
2. That the proceeding was n1alieiou.s. 
3. That the proceeding was finally terminated in 
favor of the plaintiff. 
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We submit that the evidence showing lack of proba-
ble cause on the part of the defendant for filing the 
complaint, was ample and sufficient as to a lack of prob-
able cause as to h.ave required the Court to submit the 
question to the jury. The fundamental basis of an action 
for malicious prosecutio·n-is that a defendant instituted 
a criminai pro.secution without having such information 
as would create in the mind of a reasonable person in 
the defendant's position, a:Q. honest and sincere belief 
that the accused vya_s g_l!ilty_~f_- the . cr{_m~~ -~harged. Pro-
bable cause is a suspicion founded upon circumstances 
sufficiently strong to warrant a reasonable man in the 
belief that the charge is untrue. If the defendant himself 
did not reasonably believe in the guilt of the accused, the 
defens·e of probable cau_se _may not be relied on. 
Hardraker vs. Moore, 44 C 144; 
Carpenter vs. Sibley, 15 CA 589; ----------------
Johnson vs. Southern Pacific, 157 C 333; 
Center vs. Dollar Markets, 99 CA 2d 534 ;-222 
Pac. 2nd 136. 
Franzen v. Skink, 192 C. 572; 
Smith v. Heusley, 109 P. 2d 909. 
These cases are sound law and have been followed 
by this Court. In the case of Straker vs. Voyles, 252 Pac. 
369, the Supreme Court of Utah said: 
"The difficulty in this case, however, is that 
although the defendant produced evidence of his 
good motives and that he had probable cause, yet 
his own conduct was such that the jury were justi-
fied in believing that he did not, in good faith, 
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believe that he was not actuated by legal malice*** 
As before stated, while the question of probable 
cause is ordinarily one of law, or at least one of 
mixed law and fact, as it is sometimes said, yet 
when as in this case, a defendant's motives or 
belief are in issue, it is the exclusive province 
of the jury to determine wheth.~r or not he was 
actuated by proper motives and whether- or not 
he had sufficient cause to believe and did believe 
the plain tiff insane.'' 
In the ca~e of Sweaton vs. Lilnton, 241 Pac. 309, Page 
312, this Court said: 
"The authoriti~_s .gener~~Jl_y _ hold_t]lat it is.~ 
defe~se fi:)itii acf1onfor malicious prosecutio-n, -tQ~ 
a defendant _to_ show that he had fairly and fully 
stated all of the facfs out of \vhich the pros~~]Jt~_on 
arose to a reputable attorney, and hAd been.ad-
vised by such attorney that there \vas probable 
cause to initiate the criminal proceedings· agaiiist 
the complaining party. It must appear, ho,vever, 
without contradiction, that a full and aecura.,te 
.statement of all of the facts was made to the at-
torney before the advice 'vas giveJL .JBi,d that the 
party was advised that he had probable cause to 
initiate the prosecution .and ~hat he, in good fa_ith, 
did believe that there \Yas prooab1e--cause. There 
is some conflict in the autho-rities upon-'this par-
ticular question. 0]lr Court, however, is committed 
to the rule that a 'full and fair statenlent to a repu-
table attorney, .. a:nd acting upon the advice of such 
atto·rney, that there \vas probable cause is a com-
plete ~~d good defense unless there is some par-
ticular evidence or circumstances or facts which 
would tend to show that the defendant disbelieved 
the fact that he had probable cause-
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"From all of the facts appearing in this 
record, we are of the opinion that the question 
as to wheth~r Linton,_ in_gQqd faith, believed that 
there -wa~p·robable cause for the prosecution of 
plaintiff, was fq__r_ p]!e jury."_ ' 
~----- ----- ...... 
The court cited the case of McKenzie vs. Canning, 
42 Utah 529; 131 Pac. 1172, in which this Court said, in 
the course of its opinion: 
"It however in effect is urged that before 
.advice of counsel may be a defense, it must appear 
not only that the defendant fairly stated all the 
facts to counsel, and upon them was advised, but 
also that the defendant, in good faith, believed 
the plaintiff guilty of the charge and as to such 
fact, the plaintiff was entitled to the judgment of 
the jury." 
We submit that the facts, as heretofore set forth in 
~7--:.. ...... -~""----·------~-~~1 ': -. ~-~~- -... ~.~~;.._--... •· 
the Statement of Facts, all of which are in this record 
and undisputed, clearly b~!.!g~ thi§_ease within the rule 
established that before the defendant can take advantage 
of the defense of pro hable caus~, he m_ust hi:f!!self ~~t11ally 
believe-fliai_there was probable cause an~.t~at whether he 
did in fact .actually believe that there was probable cau.se,-
'Nas a question of fact for the jury. The affidavit of 
,;t< ... .._ ...... ,............ • ~....;..-...:~ 
Jay Banks, Chief Criminal Deputy County Attorney, on 
--- - . 'J!or ~ 
file in--this case (P. 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14) recites that at 
the time Mr. Bowen, attorney for the defendant company 
and- Mr. -McGah.an, the company's auditor, appeared be-
fore him and requested a criminal complaint against 
Olson, that they represented to Banks that Olson with-
dre::v the funds which were in dispute, and that he moved 
from Utah without notice or knowledge of the defendant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
corporation or its agents, and Banks specifically recites 
that Bowen and l\1cGahan represented to him, "That 
efforts had been made to locate Olson without suceesB, 
that he could not be located in thee State_ of Utah, and 
that the-Iooepe:rid.enf ·order of Foresters first _learne~ f!f 
the withdrawal of said funds from the Utah Savings and 
Trust Company and of Olson's removal to Ca:lifornig 
abouf January 6, 1956." Whereas, in truth and in fact, 
the Vice Preesident of the defendant company _and the 
company's resident agent in San Francisco, in December 
of 1955 had both wired and telephoned Olson at his 
address in-~alnut_Creek, Calif()!nia, inviting the Olson's 
to have-- a -social evening with them, and the Olson's did 
meet with the Vice President of the company in San 
Francisco and the company's resident agent there, and 
spent the evening with them. The statement of the defend-
ant company's agents to the County .... \.ttorney were in 
bad faith because they knew all the tune where Olson 
was, because they had located him ·w·ithout any trouble 
in Walnut Cteek, California in December of 1955. 
We particularly call attention of the Court to the 
affidavit of vVm. L. Beezley (P. 15, 16 and 17) in which 
Mr. Beezley, on oath, stated that during the hearing of 
the criminal case, 1\lr. Banks said to hin1 that if Olson 
would agree not to sue the defendant con1pany for nlali-
cious prosecution, he Banks \vould disn1is.s the criminal 
action, which offer Olson declined. To this affidavit, Mr. 
Banks has never replied, by counter-affidavit or in any 
other manner. Banks further stated in his affidavit (P. 
13) that McGahan .and Bowen also advised him that Olson 
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had returned to Salt Lake City for said trial and would 
be in town on that date. Bowen and McGahan requested 
the criminal complaint on the 19th day of J.anuary, 195G 
and the civil suit for an accounting between the parties 
was to be heard the next day, January 20, 1956. So that 
McGahan, who signed the complaint and Mr. Bowen, 
his attorney could not have honestly believed, at the time 
the cri1ninal complaint was filed, that there was probable 
cause for the -issuance ·.of the complaint. And that the 
only :reason that they could have had for filing the crim-
inal complaint, the day before the trial, was to use th'2 
County Attorney's office as a collection agency. 
Mr. Banks also stated in his affidavit, that McGahan 
and Bowen had advi_sed him th.at approximately two years 
had elapsed between the time of Olson's termination of 
employment by the defendant corporation and the date 
on which they appeared before him requesting a criminal 
complaint, and that during this entire two ye.ars, negotia-
tions were had between J\;Ir. Bowen, who represented the 
defendant and Romney and Boyer and William L. 
Beezley, who had represented the plaintiff, trying to 
work out a compromise settlement of the financial diffi-
culties between them. And Bowen had also advised hin1 
that Olson had filed a civil suit in the District Court 
demanding an accounting, which was to be heard the 
next day. Banks further stated in his affidavit (P. 11) 
that Olson's attorneys wrote the Foresters on Feb. 18, 
1954, informing said Order of these withdrawals of pre-
miums by Olson, and further advising that said funds 
vvould be held by Olson in his name in Utah Savings 
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and Trust Company until there was a satisfactory ad-
justment of the amount claimed by Olson to be owing, 
as a result of termination of his ·employment with said 
Order. In other words, when McGahan, an auditor for 
the comp·any, who had been subpoened by his company 
to appear in court the next day and testify against Olson, 
as one of the comp.any's auditors and ~1r. Bowen, as 
attorney for the defendant company, both knew that the 
financial matters in dispute were in civil litigation in the 
District Court, that the company had received a letter 
from Olson's attorney stating that he was holding the 
money until .a compromise settlement could be effected, 
or a decision by the District Court, and that the civil trial 
was going to take place the next day, and that Olson 
would be present in court the next day; they could not 
have hone·stly believed that there was probable cause 
for issuance of .a criminal complaint. 
The trial court did not follow these well established 
principles of law heretofore settled by this Court, but 
granted a motion for non suit, against the plaintiff, in 
the following words: "Mrs. Gold and gentlemen of the 
jury, the motion made by the defendant, based on the 
Kennedy Case, 154 Utah, will be granted" (P. 214). 
183 Pac. 325, 5 A.L.R. 1682. 
The trial court, in gr;anting defendant's motion for 
a non suit, depTived the_ p1aii1t~ff __ Qj his _right to have 
the jury determine the question of fact as tQ-whether fue_ 
defendant actually did in fact honestly believe that there 
was probable cause for the issuance of the complaint at 
the time he had the criminal coin plaint issued. 
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Malice in a l!lalicious prosecution .action may be in-
ferred--from a malicious motive. Naylor v. Peters, 139 
- ----- ------
c·A 244. The motive of the defendant in making the 
criminal charge is a matter to be .considered by the 
jury in--determining the existence of m.alice in a mali-
cious prosecution suit. Runo v. Williams, 162 C. 444. 
Many courts have held that the use of the criminal 
process to collect ;~private debt. i~~--;;ia;~ce~~~/malice. 
The case 6-f Schnatho-rst v.=-Williams -(Iowa) -3l:l'NW-2d 
739, 10 ALR 2d 1199 at 1213, cite.s many cases supporting 
this proposition and states : 
"The use of criminal process to effect a personal 
and private purpose is in itself evidence of de-
fendant's lack of good faith in the prosecution." 
And in White v. International Text Book Co. (Iowa) 
136 NW 121, the court said : 
"It is a universal rule that, if one makes use of 
the criminal law for some collateral or private 
purpose rather than to vindicate the law as to 
compel ... the payment of a debt, such proceed-
ing will be deemed malicious." 
We respectfully urge that the rule expressed in these 
cases just quoted be specifically adopted as the rule in 
this state. 
In addition to the evidence of malice from the use 
of the criminal process to collect a private debt, the 
jury had the right to infer malice from the want . o{ 
proba/ble ... -cause~- --Singleton v. Sitngleton, 68 CA 2d 681. 
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The evidence in this record clearly shows that the 
defendant did not actually believe that he had probable 
cause for filing of the criminal complaint against the 
plaintiff at the time he had the complaint issued, .and the 
c·ourt completely ignored the v,;-ell established rule of 
law concurred in by this Court, that the defense of prob-
able cau.se is not available to the defendant, if he does 
not actually himself believe that there was probable 
c.ause; and whether the defendant actually hin1self be-
lieved that there was probable cause is a question to be 
submitted to the jury under proper instructions. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN SUSTAINING 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTIO·N FOR A NON SUIT AND IN 
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S ACTION, WITHOUT SUBMIT-
TING THE CAUSE TO THE JURY. 
The trial court, in sustaining the defendant's n1otion 
~-. --
for dis1nissal, and ba_sing it entirelY on the KennedY case, 
-~-- --~ "· .. ~-----~-~-· 
took the position that sinee the plaintiff~ad be~n bound 
over to the District Court by a 1nagistrate, .and that such 
a biii-diiig-over- by-the Co-1m11ifting l\Iag·ist;ate c.onstituted 
prinia facie evig~nce of·p~~bable c-ause-~iid c-oi1ld @1! 
-- - ---- --·-- ----
be relJutted by evidence sho,ving frau_d, perjury, ~E __ ~!~~~ 
undue or unfair n1eans en1ployed by the defendant. This 
- - -- ..., __ 
we submit was a 1nisapplication of the la"~ by the Court 
to the facts as they appeared in the record in this case. 
In the case at bar, the Con1n1itting l\Iagistrate bound 
the plaintiff over to the District Court to stand trial for 
embezzlement, and on trial of the case before the District 
Court, was found "not guilty". Does this constitute prilna 
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facie evidence of probable cause that can be rebutted 
only by evidence of fraucl, _perj_~J:'X_~ClE -~~?-~E- undue_ o~~ 
unfair means~ We think A not. 
____...... -- '""'··--···· ____..,_...,.. •. ~--.a 
We think that this Court has long been committed 
to the doctrine that the binding over of the plaintiff to 
the District Court for trial, constitutes only prima facie 
evidence of probable cau.se and Gan be rebutted by any 
competent evidence, which mus"tbe~u~~tted to the jur~ 
and that th;plainti_{fdoes ~~t have 'tocimpeach the judg-
ment of the Committing Magistrate by -~vidence of per-
jury_ or f~Jse testimony. In the c.ase of Johnson vs. 
J.o/Ieager, 47 Pac. 861, (Utah) Pg. 865, Column 1, __ this 
Court said: 
"It is true that the Justice decided in favor of 
the prosecution and held the plaintiff, Annie, to 
give a bond to keep the peace, but when the case 
was brought before the District Court, the prose-
cution dismissed the action and said that no pro-
bable c.ause existed. The judgment of magistrates 
against defendants in prose·cution t9 bind persons 
to keep the p·eace and in preliminary examinations 
are not conclusive. They simply furnish a prima 
facie-presumption of ·probable cause: Denier vs. 
Huber (75 Cal.-287; 17 Pac. 205). Ne~,vell on Mali-
cious Prosecution, P.age 290; Brown vs. Toure, 4 
Cushing 217. The order holding the plaintiff for 
bail should have been submitted with all the other_ 
competent relevent and material e.vidence to the 
jury, upon the is_sue of probable cause under pro-
per instructions." 
In this early case, this Court recognized the funda-
mental difference and distinction between the probative 
__ .,. 
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value to be given a case where the defendant has merely 
been bound over by a Committing Magistrate to stand 
trial in the District Court, and a case like th~ 
case in which there .b.ad ... b_~~R-~!1- actual trial by a jury 
and· c-ou:ftvested with power _to make final disposition 
of the ca_s·~-,~~~ter ji-ldgment -~~d~enteiice~-The' two classes 
of c~se;·are entirely separate and distinct, and the rule 
of law, as enunciated by this c·ourt in the Kennedy case, 
certainly does not apply to the facts of the case at bar, 
where the defendant had merely been bound over by a 
Committing Magistrate vested with no power to render 
a final judgment or impose sentence. Much confusion has 
arisen in the_se cases, because many of the trial courts, 
including the c.ase at bar, have failed to re-cognize the 
-~--------~ .... 
d~stinction between that class of cases where there has 
~-~ .... ~-=·-··~ ----···· - - .. -.. -. 
bee!?- ~Jil!~J judgment in --a trial of tll~ case;-ettner _ b: 
---------- ·-------- •' ''' - . -----
the Court or a jury, as in the Kennedy case, and that 
class o:f-ca~~s where there has siit;ply be~ -a b~dmg 
over by .a Committing ~fagistrate, not vest'e~d _Flt_h~-~ny 
power to -dec! de- ·th_~- ~ssues ~~~ inlp~-~~- p~~~hment, but 
can only decide that there is some cause to hold the 
plaintiff for trial in the District Court. The distinction 
between these two classes of cases is ver~~ ably set forth 
in the case of Ross t'S. Hix·on_. 12 L.R.A. 760, \Yherein 
the Court said: 
"The sole question discussed in the oral argu-
Inent of coun.sel for defendant in error~ and the 
briefs on both sides is as to the \Yeight to be given 
the finding of the examining 1nagistrate .as to 
whether it is prima facie or conclusive on the ques-
tion of probable cause and \Yhether or not, in 
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either case, the finding must be attacked for fraud 
or undue means by proper allegations in the peti-
tion-
"W e have been unable to find a reported case 
in which the rule has been held as reported by 
counsel for defendant in error. There are cases 
that so hold where the magistrate has power to 
render a judgment of conviction. How much 
weight, as proof of probable cause, shall be attri-
buted to the judgment of .a Court in an original 
action, when subsequently reversed for error, is 
elaborately discussed in the Supreme Court of 
the United States in the case of Crescent City 
L.S.L. and S. H. c·o. vs. Butchers Union, 120 US 
141, 308 Law Edition, 614, a case much relied 
on by counsel for defendant in error. To our mind, 
however, the distinction between that case and the 
one at bar is plain and distinct. If the magistr.a te 
in Bourbon City had possessed the statutory 
power to hear the evidence and determine the guilt 
or innocense of the defendant and to punish by 
fine or imprisonment, if guilt was found, then his 
finding and judgment would come -vvithin the rules 
established by that case to be the law of the land. 
The question in this c.ase is how much weight, as 
proof of probable cause, shall be attributed to 
the finding of an examining magistrate that an 
offense had been committed and that there is 
probable cause to believe the defendant guilty 
thereof. When the defendant is susequently dis-
charged, the prosecution .against him confessedly 
ended, and he has instituted an action for mali-
cious prosecution against the complaining witness. 
In the one case, there is a solemn judgment ren-
dered by a court having full and complete juris-
diction, both of the parties and the subject matter, 
binding on all until reversed upon .appeal or error. 
In the other case, there is a finding in effect, that 
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sufficient facts have been developed that justify 
a magistrate in sending the parties before a Court 
competent to ultimately deal with the question of 
guilt or innocense. Aga~_1_ :while __a__con-¥iclion is 
generally conclusive of probable cause, yet it may 
be overcome -nysliovv~ng that it was procurred by 
fraud, undue means,gr the false-±e.stim-Ony Df the 
prosecution. ·- -- · 
"In such a case, the petition in the action for 
malicious pro.secution must directly attack the 
judgment of conviction or it will be suicidal. It is, 
therefore, unimportant whether the words used 
by the Court in the Bower vs. Clay or dicta or 
authoritive in that case, as they express the la~.~ 
as universally held b·y all courts of last resort 
that have .spoken on the subject. It_ follows that 
the other suggestions o{_._~gunsel, that_llie frndiDg 
of the magistrate ni!ist J~g_ di~ectl~__a_tta.cked in 
the Petition for fraud or undue means is ''ithout 
force, becau·se tliat ~ f~ndTn_g is only._pr~~- facie. 
because a11 that- is necessary- foi~--plaiiitiff to -do-. 
to win, is to overthrow it b~~ a prep~iiide1-;ance -=m_ 
the evidence." 
Walton Trust Co. rs. Taylor, 2 Fed. 2nd, 342, the 
Court said: 
"\V-e think these instructions clearly state the 
la "\V on the n1atter of the binding over of plaintiff 
h)~ the Justire of the Peare .and the acquittal of 
the plaintiff in the Circuit Court, and the follo"\\~­
ing was said : 
"Inas1nuch as the he~ring _oefoxe.the ~Iagis­
trate-that is to say the Justice of the Peace-
\vas for the express purpo.se of inquiring into 
the existence of probable cause, and in as n1uch 
.as in this ease, such inquiry "\vas n1ade "\vhich re-
sulted after hearing on the n1erits in the conclu-
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sion and judgment of the magistrate that the 
plaintiff should be held for trial in the Circuit 
Court, this judgment of the magistrate constitutes 
in law, prima facie evidence of such fact, namely 
probable cause, to believe that the defendant was 
guilty. By prima facie evidence is not that degree 
o{ proof which in the absence of satisfactory 
rebutting proof-will justify a jury in concluding 
that the defendant had probable cause to believe 
the plaintiff guilty. 
"Now then, speaking ag.ain of the evidence and 
of - the finding of the magistrate upon the pre-
liminary hearing, such evidence gentlemen, is not 
conclusive, b11t is _to-- he_taken and considered by 
you in-- connection with all the evidence in the 
case-
"Counsel for defendants contend that the 
action of the justice of the peace was conclusive 
on the question of probable cause, unless the 
plaintiff showed such .action of the justice was 
procured by fraud or pe~rjured testimony, citing 
Hansen vs. Huber 271 Mis_souri, 326. 197 South-
western 68. We do not think the case supports 
counsel's contention. The question there involved 
was not as to the evidentiary value of a committ-
ment on the question of probable cause, but the 
question involved was as to the evidentiary value 
of the judg1nent of conviction which had been re-
ver_sed. 
"The charge of the trial court in the instant 
case, as to the effect of the committment by the 
justice of the peace, is amply sustained by the 
authorities." 
In Foster vs. Evans, 297, Pac. 106, the California 
Court said: 
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"The fact alone that reasonable men divided 
on the question of guilt or innocense, would of 
itself seem to be .slight, if any evidence of probable 
cause, but there is no question that the fact that 
respondent was held to answer is prima facie evi-
dence of the existence of probable cause, but it is 
not conclusive. Diemer vs. Herber, 75 California 
287; 17 Pac. 205, and while th~_~.roe£ 
is on the .plaintiff:jn an actionior...malicitl-Us-pr-ase.:: 
cutio:JJ, t9 _,show .w-ant-·of---prebabl~~.±here is 
ample evidence in the record here." 
Steidham vs. Diamond, State Brewery, 21 
Atlantic 2nd 283 - "The almost uniform current 
of the law is to the effect that the~action of a 
committing magistrate or of a municipal court 
in li"olding-a"d.erendant rnbail on a crjJnjn,al charge 
to await the action of a grand jury, i~ __ _!!__prima 
facie showing of probable cause for the institutio_n 
of the charge~. so· too, is the action of the grand 
jury iri ·presenting a true bill, such indictment 
constitutes prilna facie showing of probable cause. 
In neither case does the action sho·wr conclusive 
evid~nceorprobable ·cause;-but merely prilua facie 
evidence \Yhich n1ight be rebutted by other testi-
~-o-~y. '' . --
It is perfect!~? clear that the trial court, in follo,Ying 
the Kennedy ease and appl~?ing the ruling of the l{ennedy 
case to the facts of the rase at bar, clearly f.ailed to n1ake 
a distinction bet"?een that class of rases """here there 
has been a judgn1ent by the Court on the rnerits, as in 
the Kennedy case, and "?here there had sin1ply been a 
binding over by a Cornn1itting l\{agistrate~ as in the rHse 
at bar. 
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In the l{ennedy case, this Court explicitly limited 
its ruling to the facts of that case wherein there had 
been a final judgment of conviction in the City Court and 
an appeal from the conviction, and the decision of the 
City Court reversed upon appeal. 
In th§ Kennedy c.ase, this Court said: 
---~-~--- ...... -.. _-_,__.,.._ . .,_, ___ ._._,,,_._--·. --·- -·~~·- ____ r_......""---··--~. -···-
"Neither is it contended th.at the Complaint 
fails to show that the proceeding finally termin-
ated in favor of the plaintiff. The que.stion is 
narrowed down to the proposition as to whether 
or not the cornplaint, on its face discloses a want 
of probable cause for the proceeding complained 
of. The complaint alleges the fact that the 
plaintiff, in the City Court, was convicted 
of the offense instituted against him by the de-
fendant. And under authorities hereinafter cited, 
such a conviction is at least prima facie evidence 
of probable cause for the prosecution, notwith-
standing the conviction is afterwards reversed. 
Some of the ~uthorities go so f.ar as to hold that 
such evidence is absolutely conclusive, but in our 
opinion, the weight of judicial opinion, as well a.s 
that of jurists and text writers, is to the effect 
that evidence of a convic_tion is only prima facie 
and may b-e- rebuffed by competent evidence, which 
impeaches the validity of the judgment. As will 
be seen from the decisions to which we shall refer, 
the most common expression is that a judgment 
of c-onviction against the -plaintiff, in a case of 
this kind, can_ be impeached and _overthrown only 
by showing that tlie judgment was procured by 
perjury, fraud, or other undue means." 
It is perfectly apparent that this Court, by its ex-
pres.sed language, intended to confine its ruling, requiring 
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that the judgment could be over-turned only by evidence 
of fraud and perjury, was limited to those cases where 
there had been a conviction and that as far as this Court 
would go. 
" ..... Conceding this to be true, there is no 
escap·e from the conclusion that a judgment of 
conviction followed by a reversal, when offered as 
evidence in a case for malicious prosecution, is at 
least prima facie evidence of probable cause for 
the prosecution. It follows therefore, that where 
the complaint ·itself, in an action for malicious 
prosecution, shows that plaintiff was convicted in 
the proceeding complained of, notwithstanding 
a reversal afterwards on appeal, the complaint 
fails to state a cause of action, unless it goes 
farther .and alleges some fact or facts, the legal 
effect of \vhich is to ilnpeach the validity of the 
judgment and render it \vorthless as e\idence of 
probable cause. The fact or facts so alleged should 
be to the effect that the judgment of conviction 
relied on as proof of probable cause procurred 
by fraud, perjury or other undue or unfair 
means." 
The expre.ssed language of this court llinits its ruling 
to those cases in \vhieh there had been a judgment of 
conviction. And only in such eases \\~ould it require evi-
denee of fraud or perjur)~ in order to attack the judg-
ment. 
Clearly, this eourt in the l{ennedy case confined its 
decision to the particular facts of that case, ruunely, 
where thert> had been a conviction and a judg1nent in the 
City c·ourt, by a court and jury vested by la" ... ,vith 
authority to tr) ... the facts and n1ake .a final judg1nent 
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and inflict punishment. And it did not, by its language, 
extend the ruling to include cases such as the case at 
bar where there had simply been a binding over by the 
Co1nmitting Magistrate to stand trial in the Third Judi-
cial District Court. We believe that the distinction be-
tween these two classes of cases is sound and that the 
ruling in the Kennedy case should never be extended 
by this court _so as to include cases similar to the case 
at bar and give the s.ame probative value to the decision 
of a committing magistrate as it does to the judgment 
of a Court and jury vested with authority to hear the 
facts and make a final decision and render a judgment~ 
,and requiring the plaintiff, in order to recover in a judg-
ment for malicious prosecution, to prove that the judg-
Inent of the committing magistrate was induced by fraud 
or perJury. 
To extend the rule of the Kennedy case to cases 
such as the c.ase at bar, relieves the defendant from all 
the consequences. of his malicious acts in using the crim-
inal courts as .a collection agency, and maliciously and 
intentionally injuring the plaintiff simply because the 
committing magistrate felt there was some evidence that 
should be submitted to a jury. 
All member_s of the Utah Bar and the members of 
this Court know that our committing magistrates as a 
pr.actical matter, bind the defendant over to the District 
Court, if there i~. the_ slight~§t .e-Yidence of pis guilt and 
leaves the question of his ultimate iuilt to.lh~·"Jury in 
the District Court and . for this court to give to such a 
judgment of a committing magistrate the same probative 
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value on the que.stion of probable cause, as it does a 
final judgment by a court and jury vested with authority 
to hear the facts and render a final judgment, as were 
the facts in the Kennedy ease, would not be sound law 
or justifiable by this Court. 
We believe that all the defendant was entitled to in 
this case was to have the judgment of the committing 
magistrate holding that there was probable cause sub-
mitted to the jury, along with the other evidence, as this 
court indicated in the case of Johnson vs. Meager, 47 
Pac. P. 61. 
SUMMARY 
The plaintiff was employed from 19±7 to 1954 by 
the defendant corporation as its manager for its insur-
ance business for the State of Utah, at ''"'hich time the 
plaintiff's employn1ent was terminated by the defendant. 
That at the time of the termination of en1ployment, the 
defendant was holding certain monies, \vhich the plaintiff 
claimed was owing hi1n by the defendant company for 
commissions and rene,vals earned by hin1 during his ein-
ployment. Prior to his tern1ination, the plaintiff requested 
an audit by the eon1pan~~ (P. 3-!-35) and advised the de-
fendant con1pany that he \ronld not turn the n1oney over 
until he was furnished an audit (P. 35). That at no tin1e 
did the con1p.any furnish the plaintiff \Vi th an audit, strik-
ing a balance bet,veen the plaintiff and defendant. That 
many eonferenees \vere had bet\veen the plaintiff and 
defendant and their respective attorneys for the purpose 
of trying to deter1nine \rhether or not there was any 
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money due the company. That on the 27th day of Octo-
ber, 1955, the plaintiff filed an action in the Third Judi-
cial District Court to compel the defendant to make an 
accounting and to determine the question as to which one 
was indebted to the other. In the pre-trial held before 
Judge Lewis on May 6, 1955, the c·ourt stated that the 
only issue in the case w.as an accounting between the 
parties as to the amount of renewals and commissions 
earned, and the amount of monies retained by the plain-
tiff. He also granted time for the respective parties 
hereto to make an accounting one to the other. 
The accounting suit filed by Olson w;as set for trial 
on January 20, 1956. The day before the day the case 
was to be tried, the defendant's auditor, Mr. McGahan, 
and its attorney, Mr. Bowen, secured a criminal com-
plaint ag.ainst Olson for embezzlement, well knowing 
that the issues as to who owed who the money was to 
be settled the following day in a civil action. On the next 
day, January 20, 1956, a continuance of the trial of this 
case wa.s granted by Judge Lewis, who made an order 
that plaintiff pay into the Clerk of the Court, the sum 
of $5,460.62, and also deposit $200.00 to have an audit 
made on the company's books. Mr. Olson complied in full 
with the Court order, and eventually an audit w.as made 
of the company books by Lincoln G. Kelly and Co., certi-
fied public accountants, of Salt Lake City, Utah (Exhibit 
9), which showed that there was due and owing to Olson 
approximately the sum of $9,000.00. That immediately 
upon leaving Judge Lewis's Courtroom, after the order 
above described was entered, the defendant was arrested 
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outside of Judge Lewis's Courtroom and taken before a 
Committing Magistrate, who released him without bond. 
Thereafter, the criminal case was tried in the District 
Court before a jury, who found the plaintiff "not guilty'' 
of the charges preferred against hin1. 
The facts in this record conclusively show that the 
defendant, at the time he had the criminal complaint 
issued, did not hone.stly believe that there was probable 
cause to file the criminal complaint, and that the ques-
tion of whether the defendant honestly believed that there 
was probable cause was a matter that the Court should 
have submitted to the jury. 
The evidence conclusively shows that the acts of the 
defendant corporation's auditor and attorney, in securing 
a criminal complaint for embezzlement against the plain-
tiff, the day before the trial of the issues, \Yas an overt 
act of using the County Attorney's office as a collection 
agency to compel the payment of the clain1ed indebted-
ness. 
CONCLlTSIOX 
That the Court erred in not sub1nitting to the jury 
the question as to \Yhether or not the defendant actuall: 
believed, at the tune the cri1ninal action "-as instituted, 
that there was probable cause for the issuance of said 
crilninal complaint: and, that the trial court in granting 
the defendant's n1otion for a non suit~ follo,ving the 
](ennedy case, failed to recognize the "Tell established 
rules of la\v as heretofore enu·nciated by this Court and 
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having never been r,eversed .by this Court, that there is 
a vital distinction between that class of c.ases of which 
the Kennedy case is typical, where there has been an 
actual trial by a court vested by law with authority to 
try the facts, enter a judgment, .and pas.s sentence, and 
that class of cases like the case at bar, where the plain-
tiff was only bound over to the District Court by a Com-
mitting Magistrate not vested by law with any power 
or authority to render .a final judgment and impose sent-
ence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAYMOND R. BRADY and 
DEAN E. FLANDERS, 
Counsel for Appellant 
616 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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